The Continuous Time Nonzero-sum Dynkin Game Problem and Application in
  Game Options by Hamadene, Said & Zhang, Jianfeng
ar
X
iv
:0
81
0.
56
98
v1
  [
q-
fin
.PR
]  
31
 O
ct 
20
08
The Continuous Time Nonzero-sum Dynkin Game
Problem and Application in Game Options
Said Hamade`ne∗ and Jianfeng Zhang†
September 10, 2018
Abstract
In this paper we study the nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time
which is a two player non-cooperative game on stopping times. We show that it
has a Nash equilibrium point for general stochastic processes. As an application,
we consider the problem of pricing American game contingent claims by the
utility maximization approach.
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1 Introduction
Dynkin games of zero-sum or nonzero-sum, continuous or discrete time types, are
games on stopping times. Since their introduction by E.B. Dynkin in [10], they have
attracted a lot of research activities (see e.g. [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] and the references therein).
To begin with let us describe briefly those game problems. Assume we have a
system controlled by two players or agents a1 and a2. The system works or is alive
up to the time when one of the agents decides to stop the control at a stopping time
τ1 for a1 and τ2 for a2. An example of that system is a recallable option in a financial
market (see [15, 17] for more details). When the system is stopped the payment for a1
(resp. a2) amounts to a quantity J1(τ1, τ2) (resp. J2(τ1, τ2)) which could be negative
and then it is a cost. We say that the nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with J1
and J2 has a Nash equilibrium point (NEP for short) if there exists a pair of stopping
times (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) such that for any (τ1, τ2) we have:
J1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) ≥ J1(τ1, τ
∗
2 ) and J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) ≥ J2(τ
∗
1 , τ2).
The particular case where J1 + J2 = 0 corresponds to the zero-sum Dynkin game. In
this case, when the pair (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) exists it satisfies
J1(τ
∗
1 , τ2) ≤ J1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) ≤ J1(τ1, τ
∗
2 ), for any τ1, τ2.
We call such a (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) a saddle-point for the game. Additionally this existence implies
in particular that:
inf
τ1
sup
τ2
J1(τ1, τ2) = sup
τ2
inf
τ1
J1(τ1, τ2),
i.e., the game has a value.
Mainly, in the zero-sum setting, authors aim at proving existence of the value
or/and a saddle point for the game while in the nonzero-sum framework they focus
on the issue of existence of a NEP for the game.
In continuous time, for decades there have been a lot of works on zero-sum Dynkin
games [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26]. Recently this type of game
has attracted a new interest since it has been applied in mathematical finance (see
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e.g. [3, 15, 16, 17]) in connection with the pricing of American game options intro-
duced by Y.Kifer in [17]. Comparing with the zero-sum setting, there are much less
results on nonzero-sum Dynkin games in the literature. Nevertheless in the Marko-
vian framework, among other papers, one can quote [4, 7, 23, 24] which deal with the
nonzero-sum Dynkin game. In non-Markovian framework, E.Etourneau [14] showed
that the game has a NEP if some of the processes which define the game (Y 1 and
Y 2 of (2.1) below) are supermartingales. Note that even in the Markovian setting,
an equivalent condition is supposed. On the other hand, there are some other works
which study the existence of approximate equilibrium points (see e.g. [21]).
The main objective of this work is to study the existence of NEP for nonzero-sum
Dynkin games in non-Markovian framework. For very general processes, we construct
an NEP and thus it always exists. This removes the Etourneau’s type of conditions
and, to our best knowledge, is novel in the literature. Our approach is based on the
Snell envelope theory. We next apply our general existence result to price American
Game Contingent Claim by the utility maximization approach. Kuhn [18] studied
a similar problem by assuming that the agents a1 and a2 use only discrete stopping
times and exponential utilities. We remove these constraints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we precise the setting
of the problem and give some preliminary results related to the Snell envelope notion.
In Section 3, we construct a sequence of pairs of decreasing stopping times and show
that their limit pair is an NEP for the game. Finally in Section 4, we apply the result
of Section 3 to price American Game Contingent Claim by the utility maximization
approach.
2 Formulation of the problem
Throughout this paper T is a real positive constant which stands for the horizon of
the problem and (Ω,F , P ) is a fixed probability space on which is defined a filtration
F := (Ft)0≤t≤T which satisfies the usual conditions, i.e., it is complete and right
continuous.
Next:
- for any F-stopping times θ, let Tθ denote the set of F-stopping times τ such that
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τ ∈ [θ, T ], P-a.s.
- let [D] denote the space of F-adapted IR-valued right continuous with left limits
(RCLL for short) processes ζ such that the set of random variables {ζτ , τ ∈ T0} are
uniformly integrable.
We consider a game problem with two players a1 and a2. For i = 1, 2, the player
ai can choose a stopping time τi ∈ T0 to stop the game. So the game actually ends
at τ1 ∧ τ2. Each player ai is associated with two payoff/cost processes X
i, Y i. Their
expected utilities Ji(τ1, τ2), i = 1, 2, are defined as follows:
J1(τ1, τ2)
△
= E
{
X1τ11{τ1≤τ2} + Y
1
τ2
1{τ2<τ1}
}
and
J2(τ1, τ2)
△
= E
{
X2τ21{τ2<τ1} + Y
2
τ1
1{τ1≤τ2}
}
.
(2.1)
That is, if the player ai is the one who actually stops the game (i.e. τi < τj for j 6= i),
then he receives X iτi ; if the game is stopped by the other player aj (i.e. τj < τi), then
ai receives Y
i
τj
. In the case that τ1 = τ2 we take the convention that a1 is responsible
for stopping the game. We can of course assume instead that a2 is responsible in this
case and thus the corresponding payoffs/costs inside the expectations in (2.1) become
X1τ11{τ1<τ2} + Y
1
τ2
1{τ2≤τ1} and X
2
τ2
1{τ2≤τ1} + Y
2
τ1
1{τ1<τ2}.
Throughout the paper we shall use the following assumptions.
A1. The processes X1, X2, Y 1, Y 2 belong to the space [D], and X1, X2 have only
positive jumps;
A2. P-a.s., X it ≤ Y
i
t for any t ≤ T ;
A3. For any τ ∈ T0, P ({X
1
τ < Y
1
τ }\{X
2
τ < Y
2
τ }) = 0.
The assumption A1 is more or less the minimum requirement for the problem.
A2 implies that there is penalty for stopping the game early. We can study similarly
the situation with reward for early stopping, namely to replace A2 with X it ≥ Y
i
t .
Moreover, if we assume X2 < Y 2, then A3 is redundant.
Our main goal is to study the NEP of the game.
Definition 2.1 We say that (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) ∈ T0
2 is a Nash Equilibrium Point of the Nonzero-
sum Dynkin game associated with J1 and J2 if:
J1(τ1, τ
∗
2 ) ≤ J1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ), J2(τ
∗
1 , τ2) ≤ J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ), ∀τ1, τ2 ∈ T0. (2.2)
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As pointed out previously, this problem has been studied by several authors in the
Markovian framework [4, 7, 23, 24], i.e, when besides to Assumptions A1-A3, the
processes X i and Y i are deterministic functions of a Markov process (mt)t≤T . If this
latter condition is not satisfied, E.Etourneau showed in [14] that the game has a NEP
when Y 1 and Y 2 are supermartingales. Note that even in the Markovian framework
authors assume an equivalent condition to Etourneau’s one.
Our main result is the following theorem, which assumes only Assumptions A1-
A3 but without any regularity assumption on Y 1, Y 2.
Theorem 2.2 Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A3, the nonzero-sum Dynkin game
associated with J1 and J2 has an NEP (τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ).
We shall construct (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) in next section. Our construction is based on the Snell
envelope of processes which we introduce briefly now. For more details on this subject
one can refer e.g. to El-Karoui [13] or Dellacherie and Meyer [9].
Lemma 2.3 ([9], pp.431 or [13], pp.140) Let U be a process in the space [D]. Then,
there exists an F-adapted IR-valued RCLL process W such that W is the smallest
super-martingale which dominates U , i.e, if W¯ is another RCLL supermartingale
such that W¯t ≥ Ut for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , then W¯t ≥ Wt for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The process
W is called the Snell envelope of U . Moreover, the following properties hold:
(i) For any F-stopping time θ we have:
Wθ = esssup
τ∈Tθ
E[Uτ |Fθ] (and then WT = UT ), P − a.s. (2.3)
(ii) Assume that U has only positive jumps. Then the stopping time
τ ∗
△
= inf{s ≥ 0,Ws = Us} ∧ T
is optimal, i.e.,
E[W0] = E[Wτ∗ ] = E[Uτ∗ ] = sup
τ∈T0
E[Uτ ]. (2.4)
Remark 2.4 As a by-product of (2.4) we have Wτ∗ = Uτ∗ and the process W is a
martingale on the time interval [0, τ ∗].
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3 Construction of a Nash Equilibrium Point
In this section we shall construct a sequence of pairs of decreasing stopping times
(τ2n+1, τ2n+2) and show that their limits (τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) is an NEP. First, notice that Y
1 is
only required to be RCLL, and that Y 1T is never used in (2.1), for notational simplicity
at below we will also assume without loss of generality that
A4. P-a.s., Y 1T = X
1
T .
We emphasize again that this is just for notational simplicity. Without assuming A4,
we may replace the integrands in (3.1) below with
X1τ 1{τ<τ2n} +
[
X1T1{τ2n=T} + Y
1
τ2n
1{τ2n<T}
]
1{τ≥τ2n},
and all the arguments will be the same.
We start with defining τ1
△
= T and τ2
△
= T . For n = 1, · · ·, assume τ2n−1 and τ2n
have been defined, we then define τ2n+1 and τ2n+2 as follows. First, let
W 2n+1t
△
= esssup
τ∈Tt
Et
{
X1τ 1{τ<τ2n} + Y
1
τ2n
1{τ≥τ2n}
}
, t ≤ T ; (3.1)
where and in the sequel Et{·}
△
= E{·|Ft}, and
τ˜2n+1
△
= inf{t ≥ 0 : W 2n+1t = X
1
t } ∧ τ2n; τ2n+1
△
=


τ˜2n+1, if τ˜2n+1 < τ2n;
τ2n−1, if τ˜2n+1 = τ2n.
(3.2)
Next, let
W 2n+2t
△
= esssup
τ∈Tt
Et
{
X2τ 1{τ<τ2n+1} + Y
2
τ2n+1
1{τ≥τ2n+1}
}
, t ≤ T ; (3.3)
and
τ˜2n+2
△
= inf{t ≥ 0 : W 2n+2t = X
2
t } ∧ τ2n+1; τ2n+2
△
=


τ˜2n+2, if τ˜2n+2 < τ2n+1;
τ2n, if τ˜2n+2 = τ2n+1.
(3.4)
We note that the integrand in (3.1) is slightly different from that of J1(τ, τ2n) in (2.1).
The main reason is that, in order to apply Lemma 2.3, we need the process U2n+1
in (3.6) below to be RCLL. But nevertheless we will prove later in Lemma 3.3 that
W 2n+1 serves our purpose well.
6
Lemma 3.1 Assume Assumptions A1 and A2. For n = 1, 2, · · ·, τn is a stopping
time and τn+2 ≤ τn.
Proof. We prove the following stronger results by induction on n:
τn ∈ T0, {τn < τn+1} ⊂ {τ˜n+2 ≤ τn}, τn+2 ≤ τn. (3.5)
Obviously (3.5) holds for n = 1, 2. Assume it is true for 2n− 1 and 2n. We shall
prove it for 2n + 1 and 2n+ 2.
First, define
U2n+1t
△
= X1t 1{t<τ2n} + Y
1
τ2n
1{t≥τ2n}. (3.6)
Since τ2n is a stopping time, by Assumptions A1 and A2 we know U
2n+1 is in space
[D] and has only positive jumps. Apply Lemma 2.3, W 2n+1 is the snell envelope of
U2n+1 and τ˜2n+1 is the optimal stopping time.
If τ2n−1 < τ2n, then by the second claim of (3.5) for 2n− 1 we have τ˜2n+1 ≤ τ2n−1
and thus τ˜2n+1 < τ2n. This implies that
{τ˜2n+1 = τ2n} ⊂ {τ2n−1 ≥ τ2n}, (3.7)
which, combined with the definition (3.2), implies further that τ2n+1 is a stopping
time.
Next, on {τ2n+1 < τ2n+2}, by definition of τ2n+2 in (3.4) we have τ2n+2 = τ2n. Then
U2n+3t = U
2n+1
t for t ≥ τ2n+1 and thus
W 2n+3τ2n+11{τ2n+1<τ2n+2} =W
2n+1
τ2n+1
1{τ2n+1<τ2n+2}. (3.8)
On the other hand, if τ˜2n+1 = τ2n, by the third claim of (3.5) for 2n, (3.7), and
definition of (3.2), we have τ2n+2 ≤ τ2n ≤ τ2n−1 = τ2n+1. Thus {τ2n+1 < τ2n+2} ⊂
{τ2n+1 = τ˜2n+1 < τ2n}, and therefore, by Remark 2.4,
W 2n+1τ2n+11{τ2n+1<τ2n+2} = X
1
τ2n+1
1{τ2n+1<τ2n+2}.
This, together with (3.8), implies that
W 2n+3τ2n+11{τ2n+1<τ2n+2} = X
1
τ2n+1
1{τ2n+1<τ2n+2}.
Now by the definition of τ˜2n+3 in (3.2) we know
{τ2n+1 < τ2n+2} ⊂ {τ˜2n+3 ≤ τ2n+1}. (3.9)
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Moreover, if τ2n+3 > τ2n+1, by definition (3.2) we have τ2n+3 = τ˜2n+3 < τ2n+2.
Then τ2n+1 < τ˜2n+3 < τ2n+2. This contradicts with (3.9). Therefore, τ2n+3 ≤ τ2n+1.
Finally, one can prove (3.5) for 2n+ 2 similarly.
Following is another important property of the stopping times τn.
Lemma 3.2 Assume Assumptions A1 and A2. On {τn = τn−1}, we have τm = T
for all m ≤ n.
Proof. The result is obvious for n = 2. Assume it is true for n. Now for n + 1, on
{τn+1 = τn}, by the definition of τn+1 in (3.2) or (3.4) we have τn+1 = τn−1. Then
τn = τn−1 and thus by induction assumption we get the result.
Next lemma shows that τn is the optimal stopping time for some problem.
Lemma 3.3 Assume Assumptions A1, A2 and A4. For any τ ∈ T0 and any n we
have:
J1(τ, τ2n) ≤ J1(τ2n+1, τ2n) and J2(τ2n+1, τ) ≤ J2(τ2n+1, τ2n+2). (3.10)
Proof. First, by the definition of W 2n+1 in (3.1) we have W 2n+1τ2n = Y
1
τ2n
. Next, by
Lemma 2.3 we have W 2n+1t ≥ X
1
t for any t ∈ [0, τ2n] and W
2n+1 is a supermartingale
over [0, τ2n]. Then, for any τ ∈ T0,
J1(τ, τ2n) = E
{
X1τ 1{τ≤τ2n} + Y
1
τ2n
1{τ2n<τ}
}
(3.11)
≤ E
{
W 2n+1τ 1{τ≤τ2n} +W
2n+1
τ2n
1{τ2n<τ}
}
= E{W 2n+1τ2n∧τ} ≤W
2n+1
0 .
On the other hand, by Lemma 3.2 and Assumption A4 we have
J1(τ2n+1, τ2n) = E
{
X1τ2n+11{τ2n+1≤τ2n} + Y
1
τ2n
1{τ2n<τ2n+1}
}
= E
{
X1τ2n+11{τ2n+1<τ2n} + Y
1
τ2n
1{τ2n≤τ2n+1}
}
.
By (3.2), (3.7), and then by Remark 2.4, we get
J1(τ2n+1, τ2n) = E
{
X1τ˜2n+11{τ˜2n+1<τ2n} +W
2n+1
τ2n
1{τ˜2n+1=τ2n}
}
= E{W 2n+1τ˜2n+1} = W
2n+1
0 .
This, together with (3.11), proves J1(τ, τ2n) ≤ J1(τ2n+1, τ2n).
Similarly we can prove J2(τ2n+1, τ) ≤ J2(τ2n+1, τ2n+2).
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Now define
τ ∗1
△
= lim
n→∞
τ2n+1 and τ
∗
2
△
= lim
n→∞
τ2n. (3.12)
We shall prove that (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) is an NEP. We divide the proof into several lemmas.
Lemma 3.4 Assume Assumptions A1 and A2.
(i) For any τ ∈ T0, we have lim
n→∞
J1(τ, τ2n) = J1(τ, τ
∗
2 ).
(ii) For any τ ∈ T0 such that P (τ = τ
∗
1 < T ) = 0, we have limn→∞
J2(τ2n+1, τ) =
J2(τ
∗
1 , τ).
Proof. (i) By Assumption A1, we have
lim
n→∞
J1(τ, τ2n) = lim
n→∞
E
{
X1τ 1{τ≤τ2n} + Y
1
τ2n
1{τ2n<τ}
}
= E
{
X1τ 1{τ≤τ∗2 } + Y
1
τ∗
2
1{τ∗
2
<τ}
}
= J1(τ, τ
∗
2 ).
(ii) Since {τ < τ2n+1} ⊂ {τ < T}, we have
lim
n→∞
E
{
X2τ 1{τ<τ2n+1}
}
= lim
n→∞
E
{
X2τ 1{τ<τ2n+1,τ 6=τ∗1 }
}
= E
{
X2τ 1{τ<τ∗1 }
}
.
Moreover, note that τ ∗1 ≤ τ2n+1, then {τ
∗
1 = T} ⊂ {τ2n+1 = T}. Applying the
assumption P (τ = τ ∗1 < T ) = 0 twice we have
lim
n→∞
E
{
Y 2τ2n+11{τ2n+1≤τ}
}
= lim
n→∞
E
{
Y 2τ∗
1
1{τ2n+1≤τ}
[
1{τ 6=τ∗
1
} + 1{τ=τ∗
1
}
]}
= E
{
Y 2τ∗
1
1{τ∗
1
<τ} + Y
2
τ∗
1
1{τ=τ∗
1
=T}
}
= E
{
Y 2τ∗
1
1{τ∗
1
≤τ}
}
.
Then
lim
n→∞
J2(τ2n+1, τ) = lim
n→∞
E
{
X2τ 1{τ<τ2n+1} + Y
2
τ2n+1
1{τ2n+1≤τ}
}
= E
{
X2τ 1{τ<τ∗1 } + Y
2
τ∗
1
1{τ∗
1
≤τ}
}
= J2(τ
∗
1 , τ).
The proof is complete.
Lemma 3.5 Assume Assumptions A1-A4. Then it holds that
lim
n→∞
J1(τ2n+1, τ2n) = J1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ); limn→∞
J2(τ2n−1, τ2n) = J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ).
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Proof. (i) We first show that
lim
n→∞
J2(τ2n−1, τ2n) = J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ). (3.13)
Note that
J2(τ2n−1, τ2n) = E
{[
X2τ2n1{τ2n<τ2n−1} + Y
2
τ2n−1
1{τ2n−1≤τ2n}
][
1{τ∗
1
6=τ∗
2
} + 1{τ∗
1
=τ∗
2
}
]}
.
Since X2, Y 2 are in space [D], sending n→∞ we have
lim
n→∞
J2(τ2n−1, τ2n)
= lim
n→∞
E
{
X2τ∗
2
1{τ∗
2
<τ∗
1
} + Y
2
τ∗
1
1{τ∗
1
<τ∗
2
} +
[
X2τ∗
2
1{τ2n<τ2n−1} + Y
2
τ∗
1
1{τ2n−1≤τ2n}
]
1{τ∗
1
=τ∗
2
}
}
= E
{
X2τ∗
2
1{τ∗
2
<τ∗
1
} + Y
2
τ∗
1
1{τ∗
1
≤τ∗
2
}
}
+ I = J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) + I, (3.14)
where
I
△
= lim
n→∞
E
{[
X2τ∗
1
− Y 2τ∗
1
]
1{τ2n<τ2n−1,τ∗1=τ∗2 }
}
. (3.15)
On the other hand, set
τ
△
=


τ ∗2 , if τ
∗
2 < τ
∗
1 ;
T, if τ ∗2 ≥ τ
∗
1 .
Then τ ∈ T0 and P (τ = τ
∗
1 < T ) = 0. By Lemma 3.4 (ii) we have
lim
n→∞
J2(τ2n−1, τ) = J2(τ
∗
1 , τ) = E
{
X2τ 1{τ<τ∗1 } + Y
2
τ∗
1
1{τ≥τ∗
1
}
}
= E
{
X2τ∗
2
1{τ∗
2
<τ∗
1
} + Y
2
τ∗
1
1{τ∗
1
≤τ∗
2
}
}
= J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ).
By Lemma 3.3, we get I ≥ 0. Now by Assumption A2 we have
I = 0. (3.16)
Then (3.14) implies (3.13).
(ii) It remains to prove
lim
n→∞
J1(τ2n+1, τ2n) = J1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ). (3.17)
Similar to (3.14) we have
lim
n→∞
J1(τ2n+1, τ2n)
= lim
n→∞
E
{
X1τ∗
1
1{τ∗
1
<τ∗
2
} + Y
1
τ∗
2
1{τ∗
2
<τ∗
1
} +
[
X1τ∗
1
1{τ2n+1≤τ2n} + Y
1
τ∗
1
1{τ2n+1>τ2n}
]
1{τ∗
1
=τ∗
2
}
}
= lim
n→∞
E
{
X1τ∗
1
1{τ∗
1
≤τ∗
2
} + Y
1
τ∗
2
1{τ∗
2
<τ∗
1
} +
[
Y 1τ∗
1
−X1τ∗
1
]
1{τ2n+1>τ2n,τ∗1=τ∗2 }
}
= J1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) + limn→∞
E
{[
Y 1τ∗
1
−X1τ∗
1
]
1{τ2n+1>τ2n,τ∗1=τ∗2 }
}
. (3.18)
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By Assumption A2, we get from (3.16) that
lim
n→∞
P
(
X2τ∗
1
< Y 2τ∗
1
, τ2n+2 < τ2n+1, τ
∗
1 = τ
∗
2
)
= 0.
Applying the third claim in Lemma 3.1 we have {τ2n < τ2n+1} ⊂ {τ2n+2 < τ2n+1}.
Then by Assumption A3 we have
lim
n→∞
P
(
X1τ∗
1
< Y 1τ∗
1
, τ2n < τ2n+1, τ
∗
1 = τ
∗
2
)
= 0.
Then (3.18) leads to (3.17) immediately.
We are now ready to show that (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) is an NEP.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. We recall again that Assumption A4 is just for notational
simplicity. So in the proof we may assume it.
First, by Lemma 3.4 (i), Lemma 3.5, and Lemma 3.3, we have
J1(τ, τ
∗
2 ) ≤ J1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ), ∀τ ∈ T0. (3.19)
Similarly, for any τ such that P (τ = τ ∗1 < T ) = 0, we have
J2(τ
∗
1 , τ) ≤ J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ). (3.20)
In the general case, for any τ ∈ T0, set
τˆn
△
=


[τ + 1
n
] ∧ T, if τ = τ ∗1 < T ;
τ, otherwsie.
Then τˆn is a stopping time and P (τˆn = τ
∗
1 < T ) = 0. Thus (3.20) leads to
J2(τ
∗
1 , τˆn) ≤ J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ).
Send n→∞, we obtain (3.20) for general τ .
Combine (3.19) and (3.20), we obtain (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) is an NEP.
Remark 1 In the case when X2 = −Y1 and Y2 = −X1 then J1 + J2 = 0, i.e. we fall
in the framework of the well known zero-sum Dynkin game and then the NEP for the
game is just a saddle-point. Comparing to the result by Lepeltier and Mainguenau
[20], which is the most general paper on this subject known to date, our result provides
a new construction method of the saddle point. Additionally it is obtained under less
regularity conditions on the processes X1 and X2.
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4 Application to game contingent claims
It is by now well-known that an American contingent claim is a contract which allows
its holder to exercise at a time she decides before or at the maturity. The only role
of its issuer is to provide, if any, the pledged wealth to the buyer. In contrary, an
American game contingent claim (ACC for short) is mainly an American contingent
claim where the issuer is also allowed to recall/cancel the contract. Actually assume
that a1 (resp. a2) is the issuer (resp. buyer) of the ACC. Both sides are allowed to
exercise. Therefore it enables a1 to terminate it and a2 to exercise it at any time up
to maturity date T when the contract is expired anyway. Also if a2 decides to exercise
at σ or a1 to terminate at τ then a1 pays to a2 the amount:
Γ(τ, σ) = Lσ1[σ≤τ,σ<T ] + Uτ1[τ<σ] + ξ1[τ=σ=T ]
where:
- σ and τ are two F-stopping times
- L and U are F-adapted continuous processes such that L ≤ U . The quantity Lσ
(resp. Uτ ) is the amount that obtains a2 (resp. pays a1) for her decision to exercise
(resp. cancel) first at σ (resp. τ). The difference U − L represents the compensation
that a1 pays to a2 for the decision to terminate the contract before maturity date T
- ξ is an FT -random variable which satisfies LT ≤ ξ ≤ UT . It stands for the money
that a1 pays to a2 if both accept to terminate the GCC at maturity date T .
For this contingent claim, the seller a1 (resp. buyer a2) aims at maximizing (resp.
minimizing) her cost (resp. reward) in expectation, i.e., the quantity:
J(τ, σ) := E[Γ(τ, σ)].
where E[.] is the expectation under the probability P on the space (Ω,F).
Game contingent claims are introduced by Y.Kifer in [17] in the framework of the
Black and Scholes model. Since then, there have been several papers on the same
subject [3, 15, 16]. In a complete market, it is shown in those works that the non-
arbitrage price V0 of the GCC is equal to the zero-sum Dynkin game associated with
L and U , i.e.,
V0 = esssup
σ≥0
essinf
τ≥0
J(τ, σ) = essinf
τ≥0
esssup
σ≥0
J(τ, σ).
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Another point of view for pricing American game options, especially in incomplete
markets and in connection with the utility maximization approach, is introduced by
C.Kuhn in [18] and which is the following:
Let ϕ1, ϕ2 : IR → IR be non-decreasing and concave functions. Those functions
stand for utility functions of the seller, respectively, the buyer of the GCC. The seller
a1 (resp. the buyer a2) chooses a stopping time τ (resp. σ) in order to maximize
J1(τ, σ) := E[ϕ1(−Γ(τ, σ))] (resp. J2(τ, σ) := E[ϕ2(Γ(τ, σ))]).
Therefore if the nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with J1 and J2 has a Nash
equilibrium point (σ∗, τ ∗), i.e.,
J1(τ
∗, σ∗) ≥ J1(τ, σ
∗) and J2(τ
∗, σ∗) ≥ J2(τ
∗, σ)
then −ϕ−11 (J1(τ
∗, σ∗)) (resp. ϕ−12 (J2(τ
∗, σ∗))) is a seller (resp. buyer) price of the
GCC.
Note that if ϕ1(x) = ϕ2(x) = x, ∀x ∈ IR, i.e. the agents a1 and a2 are risk-neutral,
then the nonzero-sum game is actually a zero-sum Dynkin game, (τ ∗, σ∗) is a saddle-
point for this game and −J1(τ
∗, σ∗) = J2(τ
∗, σ∗). Moreover this latter quantity is
the value of the game. For more details on zero-sum Dynkin games one can see e.g.
[1, 5, 8, 15, 19, 20, 25, 26].
So pricing the GCC described above turns into the existence of a NEP for the
associated nonzero-sum Dynkin game. In [18], based on the article by Morimoto [22],
the author has just been able to show the existence of that NEP in the set of discrete
stopping times and exponential utility functions. Also using the result of the previous
section, we are able to fill in the gap between the discrete stopping times used in [18]
and continuous ones which we use here and, on the other hand, to allow for arbitrary
utility functions for the agents. Actually we have:
Theorem 4.1 Assume that:
(i) The utility functions ϕ1 and ϕ2 are non-decreasing;
(ii) Lt ≤ Ut and LT ≤ ξ ≤ UT , P-a.s.;
(iii) The processes ϕ1(−L), ϕ1(−U), ϕ2(L), ϕ2(U) are in the space [D]; and the
random variables ϕ1(−ξ) and ϕ2(ξ) are square integrable.
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(iv) The processes ϕ1(−U) and ϕ2(L) has only positive jumps.
Then the nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with the GCC has a Nash equilib-
rium point (τ ∗, σ∗).
Proof: Define
X1t
△
= ϕ1(−Ut)1{t<T} + ϕ1(−ξ)1{t=T}, X
2
t
△
= ϕ2(Lt)1{t<T} + ϕ2(ξ)1{t=T};
Y 1t
△
= ϕ1(−Lt)1{t<T} + ϕ1(−ξ)1{t=T}, Y
2
t
△
= ϕ2(Lt)1{t<T} + ϕ2(ξ)1{t=T}.
One can check straightforwardly that X1, Y 1, X2, Y 2 satisfy Assumptions A1-A4,
and that the value functions J1(τ, σ) and J2(τ, σ) are the same as those defined in
(2.1). Then by Theorem 2.2 we obtain the desired result.
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